Description: Russell's Paradox.
Proposition 4.14 of [TakeutiZaring] p.
14. Frege's
Axiom of (unrestricted) Comprehension, expressed in our notation as
, asserted that any collection of sets is a set i.e.
belongs to the universe of all sets. In particular, by
substituting   for , it asserted
  , meaning
that the "collection of all sets which
are not members of themselves" is a set. However, here we prove
  . This
contradiction was discovered by Russell
in 1901 (published in 1903), invalidating Comprehension and leading to
the collapse of Frege's system. In 1908 Zermelo rectified this fatal
flaw by replacing Comprehension with a weaker Subset (or Separation)
Axiom ssex 1700 asserting that is a set only when it is smaller than
some other set .
However, Zermelo was then faced with a "chicken
and egg" problem of how to show is a set, leading him to introduce
the set-building axioms of Null Set 0ex 1745,
Pairing prex 1892, Union
uniex 1947, Power Set pwex 1806,
and Infinity omex 3475 to give him some
starting sets to work with (all of which, before Russell's Paradox, were
immediate consequences of Frege's Comprehension). In 1922 Fraenkel
strengthened the Subset Axiom with our present Replacement Axiom
funimaex 2716 (whose modern formalization is due to Skolem,
also in 1922).
Thus in a very real sense Russell's Paradox spawned the invention of ZF
set theory and completely revised the foundations of mathematics!
Another mainstream formalization of set theory, devised by von
Neumann, Bernays, and Goedel, uses class variables rather than set
variables as its primitives. The axiom system NBG in [Mendelson]
p. 225 is suitable for a Metamath encoding. NBG is a conservative
extension of ZF in that it proves exactly the same theorems as ZF that
are expressible in the language of ZF. An advantage of NBG is that it
is finitely axiomatizable - the Axiom of Replacement can be broken down
into a finite set of formulas that eliminate its wff metavariable.
Finite axiomatizability is required by some proof languages (although
not by Metamath). There is a stronger version of NBG called
Morse-Kelley (axiom system MK in [Mendelson] p. 287).
Russell himself continued in a different direction, avoiding the paradox
with his "theory of types." Quine extended Russell's ideas to
formulate
the very strong New Foundations set theory (axiom system NF of [Quine]
p. 331). In NF the set of all sets is a set, contradicting ZF and
NBG set theories, and it has other bizarre consequences: when sets
become too huge (beyond the size of those used in standard mathematics),
the Axiom of Choice ac4 3571 and Cantor's Theorem canth2 3381 are provably
false! Nonetheless NF has not been shown to be inconsistent and has its
advocates - who's to say which set theory is "right"? NF is
finitely
axiomatizable and can be encoded in Metamath using the axioms from T.
Hailperin, "A set of axioms for logic," J. Symb. Logic
9:1-19
(1944). |